It may be best for those deeply interested in MNBDOs to read this first; then go back to Jack's Journey" for this more personal story -- if you're still awake!


Here, in 2019, I've updated much of what I've learnt in the four years since first researching and writing Jack's Journey, back in 2014. Some of the detail here is duplicated, explanations of what these units were and where they went, etc. Though it doesn't do any harm to go over them again, if put in a slightly different way. Understanding may thence be the greater. But these next few paragraphs explain all in the wider context of RM history without delving deeply into Jack's personal story itself.

The reason I've learnt so much about MNBDOs is so that I could track Jack's service through the war. I've had to do some study of both units to isolate Jack's unit in order to follow where he went. But the more I read about these units, the more I realise how much is still unknown, and not just by me. There are a lot of knowledgable experts on RM history out there, and even they appear uncertain, unclear, about the finer details of where these units went and when. Everyone thinks they know the truth, the whole of it, when it seems to me that no-one has a total understanding, and yay, not even me. Hence the great deal of debate online, some of which is pretty near the mark, and some of it seems confused at best.

There must be some senior RM officers of recent years, even today, who have taken on board the task of writing as near a definitive history as possible just of these units, and they will be the undoubted experts, but can I like as heck find it, or any such reference to it or them. The books on RM history published so far, only deal with MNBDOs from what was already set down in the histories published on the RM Museum Eastney's website. And that information online, whilst the museum is in the process of re-locating, (in 2019) is now no longer available to the public. Fortunately, those of us interested enough downloaded it before it was lost and have passed it around. Extracts can be found all over the internet on various family history sites and WW2 forums. And to that end, if you missed any other links, I have repeated the sections on the two MNBDO Groups right at the very bottom of this article.

I think it is also fair to say, at this stage in 2019, more is now known about SOE, Bletchley Park and the Enigma decrypts than is known about MNBDOs. Just about all that is known publically is now out there on the web, and if one 'Googles' long enough, one will discover most of all that has been written so far. Other than what was on the (now defunct) RM Museum website, the rest is on commando and WW2 forums, family histories and veterans' memories archives. And a good deal of that is contradictory, unclear and in some cases, apparently wrong info. That is not the fault of the researcher or author, for they took their original info from the museum website, and that is rather condensed and less than clear in itself.

The true story of these units, the finer details of their movements and timings, is still held deep in MOD archives, or at the National Archives at Kew. One can find the Admiralty archive reference number, make an order, then go to Kew and have them dig out the requested archive – if it has been released. Most of what we're trying to find is still restricted under 70 year or 100 year release rules. But as yet, not to be found online.

So I think it is fair to say now that the confusion and garbled information published so far may yet be corrected or clarified by new releases. There are several reasons for this ongoing confusion. The unit title did not help one bit, it not roll off the tongue, and most of the lads themselves had little idea of what their role would be. A proper name, of a ship, is far easier to recall even when it was an obscure name, and usually carried some pride with it. Years later, many MNBDO men could not accurately remember what they were in, or what the acronym stood for, when they were quizzed about it by interested members of the family. Most could only recall they were told it stood for 'Men Not to Be Drafted Overseas'. So that came as a shock then.

The senior officers who commanded these units, the brigadiers and colonels who could be assumed to know what they were about at the time – and also had access at the time to more secret information than their juniors ever had – by virtue of their age have long departed this life. Pretty well everyone that is left to ask today were young marines - none now younger than 97 - who had no more idea of where they were going and why than any other lad serving in the rest of the forces at that time. We sometimes have the senior men's memoires, but we must remember at the time they were written, they were still under the Official Secrets Act and decided - rightly or wrongly - that too much information may not be appropriate. New recruits to the forces today, particularly the Royal Marines, are far better educated in what they are about and what they are about to do than most of the lads back then. It occurs that, if not already happened, the very last surviving members of any of the two MNBDOs will have soon 'crossed the bar'.

So reading between the lines and putting pieces together so far as they are known already, we then only have resource to the increasing number of service records now being released and gathered for family historians. These are tiny snippets of information being dribbled out bit by bit, but taken altogether help to write the history. One thing these new snippets do for sure is to state whether it was unit 1 or 2 (I or II), and when a man was drafted in, and then drafted out to go elsewhere. And even then, the new 'knowledge' gained from those service records is only down to interpretation.

MNBDO ... What was it?
What then bedevils everyone is the total lack of information in between. The reason for this is that an MNBDO was treated just as if it were a ship. When a marine gunner was posted to a warship, it only says when he joined, and left, that ship's company. All the information about where that ship deployed, what actions she was in, when she was in refit, etc, is out there on various naval websites and can be easily traced. But our 'ship', an MNBDO, is still very much something of a mystery. It was to most men at the time. Officially, only the very top brass would know, or were supposed to know, where either organisation was at the time. Made more mysterious to us by the fact that once posted there, it was usually for a good, long time, often the whole duration of those unit's existance, so frequently some 4 years or more. It also seems that there were many transfers from one unit to the other, so some guys served in both. A lot of marines, and seaman, changed ship far more often than that.

Another major misconception widely held is about the role an individual Royal Marine may have undertook. Firstly, not every Royal Marine was a commando, though many folks today appear to assume as much. The term 'commando' had a much more loose interpretation than it does now, with its current association with the famous course and subsequent award of a green beret. Being in an MNBDO did not make a man a commando, though it would be true to say that every other job within this huge unit, whether driver, medic, cook, clerk, signalman, etc, was in support of those who were in the commando role - this in the days before the term 'commando' was as recognised or revered as it is now.

Additionally, there were as many men again serving as gunners in ships of the fleet as were in the MNBDOs, most of whom would never have heard of an MNBDO at the time, and had even less idea of what they did if they had heard about them - but only on the grapevine, say, if a mate was posted to one. And he was not supposed to tell! Shipboard marines did have the duel role of providing landing or boarding parties of armed men as required by the CO of their particular vessel, and in that role still fulfilled the one defined in the Napoleonic Wars and the navy of Nelson's time. Indeed, they still do that today, albeit a lot more defined and specialised. But during WW2, any man landed ashore in small boats, in small clandestine groups, secretly, in order to overwhelm his enemy by stealth and despatch him quietly with a sharp blade, by today's definition, was a commando - he was essentially fulfilling that role.

Another point, for families of men who were not Royal Marines, is that not every man in an MNBDO was a marine. Each unit had its supporting roles, and many medics were naval sick-berth attendants, doctors and surgeons were usually RN lieutenants or commanders, and officers with specialist skills were taken from the Royal Engineers and R.A.O.C. It was wartime, and needs must meant that engineering and ordnance specialities had to be brought in from the army. So the acronym MNBDO may turn up as quite a surprise on the records of men who were previously thought to have had nothing to do with the RM.

HBL
As well as MNBDO, there are often another set of initials associated with that acronym, and often used together and almost without pause, so it sometimes all runs together on a written record, HBL MNBDO, or the other way round. That was merely for 'Home Based Ledger', showing that the unit was expected to be mobile overseas and without a geographic address, or a ship's name, where the naval post office would know the deployment of that vessel in order to forward mail. Most men in an MNBDO were on the HBL, not on 'a ship's books' and so it was merely for pay records, where a man's pay should be sent to.

FORCE OVERT
Another mystery, sometimes appearing on a service record, and more often as part of the address on a man's mail, is the term "FORCE OVERT", often immediately before MNBDO I, or II.  It is part of a man's postal address, and was used in telegrams as well.  It appears that this term only appeared on a man's mail once either of these units had been posted to the Middle East, and for some of them, thence on to India and Ceylon.  But it is still a mystery to me, how a force could be so clandestine in its conception, so mysterious in it's very forgettable initials, and apparently not to be spoken of other than in whispers, that it could also be openly known about and in plain sight - all at the same time.  And used on Post Office envelopes, addressed as such by a man's family, into the bargain.  A huge secret, maritime unit of men, in plain sight to the Post Office and staff at least, addressed as such?  But, why?  The term, in the context it was used in, is contradictory English.

I reckon it was not meant to be that way.  There is a letter missing, just one.  The letter 'C'.  Some clerk, back in London when typing up the instructions to send a formation of Royal Marines to the Middle East should have typed as part of the address, "FORCE COVERT".  He was daydreaming or mis-keyed on his sweaty typewriter, and so it went out, and didn't know what overt or covert meant anyway.  What should have been a line that indicated, this is not to be bandied about, keep it to yourself, became 'tell the Post Office and tell the whole world."  Just a theory of my own.

Then there are the multi-various ways an MNBDO was written down. Group I or II often alongside it, with or without the initals RM either side, in numbers or roman numerals, the variety is astonishing. There does not appear to have been an 'official' way of writing it. But they all amount to the same thing, or the same unit. I'm convinced this was all done to mystify the Germans. It certainly mystifies us now.

COPRA
Other initials again often associated were COPRA … often interpreted on records as HMS Copra as if it were a ship. This was to signify that the man was in a unit associated with the newly formed 'Combined Operations', that included all manner of secret and clandestine units, drawn from all three services, as our War Office started to appreciate the benefit of our armed services co-operating and working together, compared to frequently being rivals that worked against each other as in previous years and wars. That is not to be confused with SOE, Special Operations Executive, even more clandestine and to do with spies, suporting resistance groups, etc, another outfit entirely. So in full, it was 'Combined Ops Pay & Records Accounting', and again, signified where a man's pay came from. A man could be HBL, in an MNBDO and COPRA all at the same time. That could take 3 lines on a man's handwritten record, but essentially all to do with administration, records and pay purposes and nothing to do with deployment or what battles or actions a man took part in.

Then we need to remember what MNBDOs were formed to do, where the idea came from. Simply put, they are a metamorphosis of the earlier 'Fortress Unit', formed in the 1930s when the danger from air attack was becoming more and more apparent. The 'fortress' specifically in mind then was Scapa Flow, the main fleet base for the Home Fleet. By the end of WW1, the danger of submarine attack on a fleet base was already appreciated, there had already been an attempted intrusion into Scapa back then. When the possibilities of air attack were added, that was then assumed could only be done by balloon, otherwise a Zeppelin, the threat took on new dimensions. Coastal bombardment of English towns had opened military chiefs' eyes to that danger, and if combined with the other two dangers and add the final possibility of an audacious shore landing, Gallipoli fashion, then Scapa was at real risk. It needed more than just shore forts of large calibre artillery, it needed other methods of defence too.

FORTRESS UNIT & RMAB
Taken in the round, that brought into being the first Fortress Unit, being a self-contained body of marines who could defend against all comers, using various specialist roles whether in searchlights, anti-aircraft, boom patrol vessels to prevent submarine incursions, or basic infantry to fight an enemy were he to succeed in making a landing. Finally, if a naval base could not be saved, the idea was for some men to be specifically trained in demolition to deny the base to the enemy. That was the plan – on paper. Indeed, it was put into action, and the first Fortress Unit in 1939 was set up in Orkney for the defence of Scapa Flow. The whole exercise, and urgency of speed to complete the defence was brought into sharp relief by the U-boat incursion that sank HMS Royal Oak at the end of November, the war barely 3 months old and one battleship and nearly 900 men already lost. An addition to this first unit was the creation of another unit within the corps, the RMAB ... Royal Marines Auxilliary Battalion. This was made up of hostilities only men, called up or volunteering for service in the earliest part of the war, through to the summer of 1940, in order to augment the Fortress Unit itself. But on men's records, this usually appears just as RMAB. The one thing that can tell us almost for sure is that they went to Orkney.

The idea of expanding the Fortress Unit role to be more mobile and be able to deploy anywhere, quickly, was born right at the start of the war, and maybe the earliest ideas pencilled out by generals and brigadiers do date from the late 30s before it all kicked off. It could be the RMAB, described above, was part of that thought process, along the road to a fully-fledged MNBDO. As it turned out, both MNBDOs did go abroad, so where a family historian may first assume, with the absence of any foreign place names, that their man did not go abroad, we can categorically say they most certainly did serve abroad. They most definitely left these shores, anyway, even if it was to only 'jump ship' at Cape Town or Durban.

It should also be realised that a good many men in an MNBDO, if not in a specialist fighting role as infantry, did very mundane and humdrum tasks, and may well have not wanted to speak about the lack of what they did afterward, and used the joke about 'men not going overseas' as a sort of shy cover for not explaining anything else. By and large, most at least served in Egypt, at first in the very low-key role of guarding Italian POWs in the huge camps set up close by the main army camps along the Suez Canal and the Great Bitter Lakes, eg, Kabrit. At the extreme, hundreds were infantrymen, or in anti-aircraft artillery and searchlight units, and a good many were killed in the shambles that was the early attack on Tobruk, the later abortive defence and evacuation of Crete, and the even later Operation Huskey and the Sicily and Italian beach landings. Some were later sent to Ceylon and took part in similar beach landings on the coast of Burma and Malaya. The total killed on all those operations must number some several hundreds all told.

So defining a man's role in an MNBDO could be problematic unless that man spoke about it, and told his family exactly what he did, as my father-in-law Jack did. It can be assumed, indeed taken as read, that for a Royal Marine, they all undertook the same basic training, parade ground drill, instruction in what it meant to be in 'The Corps', small arms instruction, and basic elements of seamanship, boat drill and the like. For a marine could thence be posted anywhere, but whether shipboard or not, he would certainly become familiar with, and learn the dangers of dockyards, gangways, and most aspects of nautical life. A marine would become a sailor, but not every sailor was a marine.

Some final points for us to remember when researching our (presumably) young Royal Marine and his postings, circa 1940-1944: One of the main roles the MNBDO was formed for was the defence of a naval harbour against air attack. To those lads then, aerial warfare and serious bombardment, familiar to our generations since, was as new to them then as cyber warfare is to us now - a totally new concept. Most of these young guys had been born at the end of the First War, into the early 1920s, to be just of the right age to fight in the Second War, and many had never even seen an aeroplane other than in pictures or on film. The teenage lads that went out on those early troopships round The Cape, trained to operate anti-aircraft guns, would not have had the faintest clue as to what they were in for. At that time, only a Spanish town had been divebombed to oblivion, and some may have seen the newsreels documenting that tragedy. Although our government expected much the same treatment very soon for all British cities, as bad as it did become, in the event none of it was quite as bad as Guernica, or later, Warsaw. The East End, and three or four other cities had their city centres pretty well destroyed, Coventry the prime example, but not in their entirety. Most cities were badly damaged, but not totally destroyed. Not such as was revisted on Hamburg or Cologne by the RAF less than 4 years later.

Also, it should be realised that, in 1940, no major warship had been sunk by aerial bombardment either. Divebombing battleships and cruisers to destruction would come very soon, too soon, but these boys had no knowledge or experience of that as yet. They could be forgiven their naivety, but the generals and admirals who commanded them could be said to have had far less excuse for theirs. Sinking a battleship with a bomb from an aeroplane was still not thought possible by many of those in charge. There were some mighty shocks to come, and we can only imagine the atmosphere of all our forces when, three weeks before Christmas in 1941 came the news that we had lost two battleships to air attack. What? Together? At the same time - on the same day? Just by aeroplanes? The news must have been as devastating to them as 9/11 was to us. It opened another chapter in the story of warfare, and one that for many of them would open very soon. When most of those guys had been born, men had only been flying at all for about 10 years! Now, flying men could sink a battleship. Seriously? Some would never get over the shock.

To sum up, as briefly as is reasonable, I can tell you what I think I've learnt for sure.

Both units went to Egypt in the first place. Primarily as defence against the expected attacks on Alexandria, a major fleet base, the canal itself, and Suez being the major port at the other end of the canal. MNBDO I went first, though incomplete, and MNBDO II was still forming as the first group left. Neither reached full strength. MNBDO I was thus thrown, in May 1941, into the defence of Crete, and lost many men there in so doing. The infantry part of the Group, the 11th Battalion RM, was assigned in Sept 1942 to the amphibious attack on Tobruk in an abortive attempt to help the Desert Army behind the lines. Another several dozen men were thus lost. The survivors of both Crete, and later Tobruk, went back to their camps in Egypt to be later reinforced and re-equipped by new drafts from the UK. One such major draft arrived in early March, 1942.

MNBDO I was, early in 1943, sent to Ceylon, and some elements to India, but primarily Ceylon. They left the Canal Zone just as most of MNBDO II were arriving to train up for their coming roles in Operation Husky, being the invasion of Sicily, and later Italy. After taking part in many of the major battles in Italy, amphibious landings along with other RM battalions at Anzio, Group II were withdrawn to the UK to train up for landing craft duties in the forthcoming invasions of northern Europe.

MNBDO I served for some time longer in Ceylon, on the west coast in defence of Columbo, and some elements over at Trincomalee on the east coast. On the way to Ceylon, a group of anti-aircraft units split off and went via Bombay and served briefly with, or at least under the command, of the Indian Army XXXII Corps. I understand these men later joined their comrades in Ceylon. As well as naval bases, they seem to have been involved in defending naval air stations on the coast also, with anti-aircraft artillery units. In February 1943, the decision had been taken to disband both Groups and bring all home to the UK to train for landing craft duties.

So later, men from both groups would have been brought together to serve in new roles, mostly landing craft, but other commando roles as well. Some anti-aircraft elements of Group II, notably the 5 Anti-Aircraft Brigade, comprising several large artillery units, were not split up and operated as they were back in Europe. But essentially, both MNBDOs were disbanded, and it appears, mostly disbanded in Scotland before dispersing to their new training areas.

Having disbanded in Scotland, on arriving back in the UK, and following a spell of well earnt home leave, most of those detailed to training for landing craft duties would then find their way to Devon, many to Dalditch Camp, a huge area of high heathland east of Exmouth. In effect, this was several large camps solely devoted to RM training.  Some men went back to North Wales and one of the several camps where they were first trained, depending on what their specific boatwork duties were to be.  Just to confuse folks even more, quite a lot of men were at both a Welsh camp and Dalditch in succession.  The history of those camps is a book in itself, for RM devotees if someone wants to write one.

So, there you have it.  I take it, then, that all is now clear, and you know where you all are going.  Yeah ... I've a feeling that was said to our marines too, and they were as clear back then as we all are now.

Have fun.  Good luck.

Back to "JACK'S JOURNEY" main page










This below is taken from the official histories of Groups I and II.
I know that technically, this info in this form is HM Copyright, but surely on the demise of the museum website, could anyone object to someone posting it in full if it gives credit to where it comes from.

MNBDO I Formation was approved as of 12 September 1939, with an establishment of 78 officers and 2,150 other ranks, but the equipment available was only a fraction of that authorised (e.g. six searchlights out of 48, 17 vehicles out of 75). Arrangements were made to train tradesmen, AA gun crews, searchlight crews, and gunnery and wireless instructors, at army establishments. The establishment was reviewed by a small HQ set up on 29 January 1940, when a provisional strength of 202 officers and 4,089 other ranks was proposed. During February, HQs were also set up for the Air Defence Group, the Land Defence Force and the Coast Defence Group. Brig Weston took command on 1 March and four days later the HQ Wing was formed with a Provost Company, Survey Section, HQ Defence Platoon and some other administrative Sections. The Landing and Maintenance Group was formed in May 1940, absorbing officers and men with experience of building piers, and handling stores and vehicles over open beaches, etc. Other subunits were formed from time to time, as shown in the unit history summaries for beach units, artillery regiments and battalions.

The majority of men in the Organisation were 'HOs', as were eventually nearly all the junior officers. The first 2,010 recruits joining the organisation in mid–February 1940 went from depots and their homes to: 1st RM AA Rgt at Arborfield, Carlisle and Blandford; 11th RM Searchlight Regiment at Taunton and Yeovil; the Land Defence Force (later 11th RM Bn) at Browndown; and the Coast Artillery Brigade with its HQ at Fort Cumberland and Hayling Island camp.

The MNBDO HQ in 1940 provided a training party in June — about the time of the retreat from Dunkirk — to advise army coastal batteries on techniques and equipment. Many subunits were detached; and, under army command, were employed in AA and other Home Defence deployments (see subunits' history summaries). During the invasion scare the HQ stood to for 72 hours from 7 to 9 September. On 21 November the AA units with the army were put at seven days' notice to revert to RM command. Exercises and training continued; then from the strength of 4,501 on 1 December 1940, 500 experienced men were provided for MNBDO II and replaced by recruits.

The HQ at Fort Cumberland was closed on 4 February 1941, and the Organisation sailed for the Middle East. After a five–day visit to Durban (South Africa), the men reached Tahal Camp in Egypt on 23 April and came under command of the C–in–C Middle East. Three ships carrying heavy gear reached Haifa (Palestine) the next day, and the equipment, guns, etc. were reloaded tactically during the next few weeks by men from the MNBDO, Meanwhile General Weston took elements of the Organisation to Crete, where they landed on 9 May and were in action as infantry during the German airborne landings and subsequent fighting (see chapter 3). There were nearly 1,200 casualties, mostly prisoners, from the MNBDO units.

During the rest of 1941 the units were brought up to strength and reorganised. General Weston hoped to use the Organisation in the Far East and resisted attempts to have subunits detached, but in February 1942, 1st RM (Heavy) AA Regiment went to Ceylon. 1st Coast Regiment with the Landing and Maintenance details, fortified island bases in the Indian Ocean. Various subunits had been in action while MNBDO I was in the Mediterranean, but the majority of time was spent in anti–aircraft defences and in training. All the searchlight units in the Canal Zone came under the command of the RM searchlight group for a time.

The stores depot from Fort Cumberland moved to Geneifa (north of Port Tewfik) in 1941, and its staff, along with other elements then in Egypt, followed the AA Regiment to the Far East in 1943. Major General W. B. F. Lukis took over from General Weston in April 1943; and the HQ of MNBDO I closed in the Middle East on 16 June, 1943, and reopened in Colombo (Ceylon, modern Sri Lanka) on 27 June. This HQ commanded two Mobile Naval Base Brigades organised for the defence of Ceylon and training for operations in Burma. The two AA regiments — 1st RM Rgt in India, 2nd RM Rgt in Ceylon — were also administered by the HQ of MNBDO I in Ceylon, until they returned to the UK, along with the personnel of the two Brigades, during the spring of 1944. The personnel were remustered that summer for landing craft, commando and other duties, the HQ finally being disbanded in September 1944, when the principal AA units formed 5 RM AA Brigade.

MNBDO II http://www.royalmarinesmuseum.co.uk/
Formed about 1 January 1941 under command of Brig H. R. Lambert (later Major General, CBE, DSC) with 50018 men from MNBDO I, including 130 from Fortress Unit I.

Many junior officers were transferred from Army OCTUs and the men were "HOs". The Organisation was based on Hayling Island (near Portsmouth), and in April bomb damage caused the HQ to be moved at least once. During the summer many of the men of the subunits were trained in various army establishments (cp: MNBDO I) including the School of Cookery at Aldershot. The HQ had moved to Bentworth (Hampshire) area in May, and for a short while had an RAF radar and balloon barrage squadron under command.

Units were deployed in the air and coast defences of the UK during 1942-3 before being concentrated in the Nottingham area early in 1943, ready for embarkation for the Middle East, where they arrived in June 1943 just before the HQ of MNBDO I left for the Far East. Subunits of MNBDO II were deployed in AA defences of north-east Malta in April and from 16 June to 9 July, before the Organisation was sent to Sicily under command of the Eighth Army. The establishment of some subunits by this date had been brought in line with army war establishments for personnel and weapons.

After service on detached duties with the Eighth Army, the units of MNBDO II were assembled in Augusta (Sicily) for embarkation and arrived in the UK in February 1944. The HQ was disbanded in May 1944, and personnel of all but those AA Regiments forming 5 RM AA Bde were sent to North Wales for selection as landing craft crews, commandos or for other duties.

5 RM Anti-Aircraft Brigade When the anti-aircraft regiments of MNBDO I and II returned to Scotland in February 1944, they were to be disbanded, but a general of the army's Air Defence Staff asked that some units be retained and from these, AA Bde HQ and Ops Room MNBDO II, 1st RM HAA Rgt (ex-MNBDO I), 3rd RM HAA Rgt (ex-MNBDO II), 4th RM LAA RGT (ex-MNBDO II) and a Signals Section (ex-MNBDO I), 5 RM AA Brigade was formed on 22 March 1944, at Hamilton (Lanarkshire), under the command of Brig J. E. Leech-Porter, OBE. His Brigade came under army command of GHQ AA Troops three days later. It was then mobilised to Army War Establishments. During May and early June the Brigade spent six weeks at the army's AA practice camp at Clacton-on-Sea, Essex. Gunnery practice and mobilisation (with all this entailed in drawing stores) were carried on at the same time, some army HAA Regiments joining the brigade in May.

During July and August the Brigade's regiments were deployed against 'flying bombs' on the south coast of England, destroying 122 of these V1s. The Brigade landed in France early in September (see chapter 7), and took over the anti-aircraft gunnery defences of the Scheldt estuary that winter, and in addition to RM formations had under command 111 HAA, 114 LAA and 133 LAA Regiments RA; 105 AA Brigade (12 army regiments); 6/2 and 415/54 Searchlight Batteries RA; and 202 Fixed Coastal Defences RA. Makeshift accommodation was improvised with shacks and "huts" along dykes (see chapter 7). Communications were also difficult with more than 2,000 miles of telephone line laid by the Brigade's signallers in a duplicate system; this connected all sites & guns, searchlights, smoke-generating machines, and operations rooms, the duplications proving invaluable after later air raids. All major units were also in wireless (radio) contact, the strength of Brigade signals units being raised from 80 to 200 personnel The heavy gun batteries fired on occasions in support of ground troops during the first few weeks of October, but their principal role was to defend against air attack in a 7,000yds circle covering Antwerp and the area to its west. When V1s began coming over on 27 October, two zones or 'belts of AA fire' were organised around Antwerp and Brussels with a corridor between; there were American AA units (with SCR 58420 radar-linked predictors and proximity fuses) in the east and south-east zones, and as the flight path of V1s brought them near to the Brussels defence zone, that could therefore contribute to Antwerp's defence.

The Brigade?s Operations Room at Antwerp recorded 483 V1 and 313 V2 (rocket) incidents in the month to 12 December 1944. Units of the Brigade also formed rescue squads with equipment to help civilians buried in wrecked buildings after V1 and V2 explosions. The German air activity increased in preparation for their Ardennes offensive. The last air attack on Antwerp, on New Year's Day 1945, was initially at low level (500ft), when the Brigade shot down four planes; around this time the V1 and V2 attacks intensified. The Brigade was relieved on 5 March 1945, and moved to Ostend. The Brigadier took over as AADC for Ostend and Calais on 11 March. The last plot in the Brigade Operations Room was for a friendly aircraft on 6 May, and the Brigade returned to the UK some three weeks later on 28 May.

Brig S. G. B. Paine commanded the Brigade in the autumn of 1945. The Brigade was stationed at South Brent (Devon) in December 1945 when they were disbanded, the HQ having been disbanded at Topsham, Devon, the month before. The continuous service personnel returned to their Divisions and the "HOs" were absorbed into the 27th and 28th RM Battalions.